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BOOK REVIEWS
ARON'S NOTES ON PROOF. Tmn PROBATIVE LAAW. By Harold
G. Aron. New York: Georgic Press. 1932. Pp. xxiv, 554.
This volume, in' addition to the foreword by the author, an
introduction by Hon. Frederick E. Crane, Judge of the Court of
Appeals of New York, and a brief postword as a conclusion, coin-
prises eleven chapters under the following titles: The Probative
Law; Judicial Procedure; Classification and Attributes of Proof;
The Declaration of Independence as Judicial Proof; Proof in
Actions ex Delicto; Proof in Actions ex Contractu; Proof in Ac-
tions Affecting Real Property; Proof in Actions Against De-
cedents' Estates; Proof in Suits in Equity; Crimes and Their
Proof; Proof Where Police Power is Involved.
A subtitle describes the book as "A commentary on evidence,
trial procedure and practice and judicial proof," thus indicating
that the discourse is not entirely confined to the subject of proof.
However, the main title and the chapter titles warrant an ex-
pectation that matters of evidence and proof will furnish some
sort of a homogeneous theme, if not for the whole volume, at
least for most of the chapters. Such expectation is doomed to
disillusionment, if not to disappointment. As a whole, the book
deals little more with matters of evidence and proof than with
numerous other topics of the law, and the reviewer would search
in vain for a theme concerned with any topic of the law so treated
as to furnish a thread for homogeneity. A much more divulging
title would seem to be "Miscellaneous Criticisms of the Law,"
or "Critical Notes on the Law," for most of the commentaries are
highly critical in nature and many of them are primarily con-
cerned with purely substantive problems of the law, where they
are concerned with the law at all. In fact, there seems to be a
pervading strained and artificial effort to interpolate references
to the probative law into topics which have little, or nothing, to
do with that field of the law, in a conscious or subconscious at-
tempt to make the text colorably conform to the chapter titles.
And it would seem that the author would have difficulty in justi-
fying lack of segregation on the assumption, which might be sur-
mised from some of his generalizations, that the probative law is
at the bottom of all the law in action, for he is continually dis-
missing many problems from discussion with the assertion that
they are problems of the substantive law.
The author would abandon the present classification of the
law into (1) Substantive and (2) Adjective, and would substitute
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therefor a tripartite division into. (1) Substantive, (2) Adjective
and (3) Probative. He seems to think that such a definitive
liberation of the "Probative Law" would, in some way not clearly
perceived by the reviewer, work the salvation of the whole field
of jurisprudence. This is a proposition sufficiently interesting
and important to call for precise analysis and extended exposi-
tion. It is something new - at least to most readers - and so
the burden of proof, if there is such a thing (the author contra, p.
64), may be taken as resting upon the author to demonstrate its
logic. Apparently, he would divide between the adjective law as
classified by him and the probative law various matters which
now are ordinarily dealt with under the law of evidence. In this
connection, he says (p. 16) : "There are principles governing the
introduction of evidence; there are no rules and there is no law
of evidence." It would seem that much of the space taken up by
digressions of various import could more profitably have been de-
voted to developing the logic of this interesting classification and
the claimed efficacy of its operation. The reviewer is in no posi-
tion to take issue with the author against it, because he has only
a vague comprehension of the use which the author would make
of it in its specific application.
In those chapters where the author undertakes to deal
specifically with matters of proof, he largely directs his efforts
to a mere enumeration of facts which it is necessary to prove. Au
inquiry as to what facts must be proved in a given case, as dis-
tinguished from the manner or method of proof, would seem to
be a function of the substantive law rather than of the probative
law. Possibly this attitude is an exemplification of the author's
view that "there are no rules and there is no law of evidence".
If such be true, then there is nothing to inquire about except
merely the facts to be proved. When they are apprehended, then
just prove them. But, one is constrained to inquire, can the whole
thing be as simple as that? Is the author's "Probative Law" to
be understood merely as comprehending the process of diagnosing
the probative facts?
Although the author believes that there are no rules and
there is no law of evidence, he warns us (p. 16) that he "will
repeatedly use that phraseology because it is ingrained in the
practice". He avails himself of this privilege on numerous oc-
casions. Many of his criticisms of rules- will be accepted by most
readers as sound and wholesome, e. g., his condemntion of the
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vagaries of the parol evidence tle; his explanation of misconcep-
tions attaching to the term "burden of proof"; and his objection
to failure to distinguish between presumptions of law and infer-
ences from facts. Much of his discussion of such matters will be
recognized as of long familiarity and as wholly orthodox in the
field of criticism. Not a few of his observations reflect a prac-
tical background which could only have come from a varied ex-
perience in the practice of the law. In this connection, may be
mentioned his sympathy with the rule (a partial survival of the
general common-law rule disqualifying parties in interest) ex-
cluding testimony of an interested person as to transactions be-
tween such person and a decedent; his recognition of the exped-
iency of impounding documentary evidence preliminary to trial;
and his recommendation of tentative decisions by courts for crit.
icism by counsel before final decision.
Much energy of criticism is expended upon the definitive im-
port, or lack of import, of specified words and phrases, a tendency
which seems rather general among critics of the law in recent
years - an insistence, as it were, that words shall have a strict
quantitative value. A puristic attitude in this respect has always
appealed to the reviewer as displaying a lack of comprehension
of the true purpose and intent of a definitive word or phrase. All
language is relative and qualitative in its aspects, at least in its
juridical applications. There is no starting point for absolute,
definition. It is surmised that, in most instances, definitive terms
are adopted by the law, not for a priori functions of inclusion
and exclusion through operation of the terms per se, but rather
as frames or skeletons into which the animated substance is to be
built by experience. Thus viewed, the meaning of a definitive
term as such depends upon what the law has brought to it, rather
than upon what it dictates to the law, and for this reason it can
never be taken as dogmatic or unbending and it is captious and
unfair to expect it to perform such an impossible function. Fow
definitions have ever been very helpful to the reviewer until he
has followed the law through some such process of accretion. This
is not a wholesale condemnation of the author's efforts in this re-
spect. Many of the words and phrases which he criticises have
been maimed after birth by misconceptions which the courts have
brought to them - by the very process of accretion to which they
have been subjected.
No attempt can be made to follow the auqthor in his various
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and abrupt digressions into topics only remotely related to his
subjects - in many instances, wholly unrelated. These de-
partures are not confined to unrelated phases of the law, but fre-
quently involve dissertations, usually of a more or less homiletie
tinge, upon pure ethics, politics, economics and the general range
of human experience. While these digressions, when they are not
too dilute in theme or prolix in material, are entertaining and add
spice to the sauce, as a whole they lay the author open to the
charge of garrulity.
In general, many of the author's observations must be recog-
nized as sane, practical and logical; while others, as he himself
freely admits, will likely be accepted as radical. The reviewer
would by no means classify the author himself as a radical. Some
of his assumptions involve what many will recognize as obvious
fallacies. For instance, his assumption (pp. 27, 220, 258), in ac-
cord with many court decisions but historically fallacious, that a
seal imports or proves a consideration; and his assumption, seem-
ingly, that the phrase quare clausum fregit characterizes tres-
passes generally, whether concerned with person, nersonality or
realty, in the following quotation (p. 303): "The formula quare
clausum fregit suggests the underlying idea of trespass; the law,
as it were, builds an imaginary wall about the person, things and
lands of a free citizen, which, to break through without his per-
mission or legal justification constitutes trespass." In mitigation
of any historical errors that the author may have committed, it
may be suggested that he has braved the hazards of a historical
approach which might well test the courage of the most meticulous
scholarship.
The author's style is forceful, frequently pungent with
epigramatic flavor and generally clear. The punctuation, how-
ever, is frequently poor and tends to confuse the diction, which
itself is not always free from criticism. At page 63, he says,
"Prima facie means sufficient, not good enough." It would seem
somewhat difficult for the ordinary mind to distinguish between
a thing which is "sufficient" and a thing which is "good enough."
At page 173, is the statement, "One-most able advocate never ap-
peared before the same jury in the same suit of clothes." At
page 194, it is said, "Testimony is elicited by examination of
court and counsel." (No doubt litigants have often wished it
were so; but alas-!) At page 404, anent construction of a will,
reference is made to "proving what a dead mind meant."
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The plan of eliminating all footnotes from the text and de-
ferring them to a supplement which does not accompany the book
will be subject to disapproval. A division of the chapters into
sections, or at least the use of topic headings, would have helped.
To sum up, the book is too lacking in homogeneity; the text
is largely foreign to the titles; the interpolated materials are fre.
quently too prolix and not sufficiently relevant to the context;
many of the digressions, though entertaining, are not justifiable;
but as a whole, the volume is thought-stimulating and reflects a
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